Contractual flexibility or rigidity for public private partnerships? Theory and evidence from infrastructure concession contracts by Athias, Laure & Saussier, Stéphane
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Contractual flexibility or rigidity for
public private partnerships? Theory and
evidence from infrastructure concession
contracts
Laure Athias and Ste´phane Saussier
University of Paris 1 Sorbonne, IDHEAP, SPAN, University of
Lausanne
13. May 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10541/
MPRA Paper No. 10541, posted 18. September 2008 09:52 UTC
Contractual Flexibility or Rigidity for Public Private Partnerships?  
Theory and Evidence from Infrastructure Concession Contracts 1 
 
Laure Athias 
  ATOM – U.  of Paris Sorbonne  
laure.athias@malix.univ-paris1.fr 
 
Stéphane Saussier  
ADIS – U. of Paris 11 & ATOM – U. of Paris Sorbonne 
saussier@u-psud.fr 
 
May 13, 2007 
 
Abstract: In this article, we explore the contractual design of toll infrastructure concession 
contracts.  We highlight the fact that the contracting parties try to sign not only complete 
rigid contracts in order to avoid renegotiations but also flexible contracts in order to adapt 
contractual framework to unanticipated contingencies and to create incentives for 
cooperative behavior.  This gives rise to multiple toll adjustment provisions and to a 
tradeoff between rigid and flexible contracts. Such tradeoff is formalized with an 
incomplete contract framework, including ex post maladaptation and renegotiation costs.  
Our model highlights the fact that trade-offs are complex and do not correspond to previous 
propositions coming from a transaction cost framework.  More precisely, those previous 
works argue that a rigid contract is to be preferred as soon as specific assets are high.  We 
highlight the fact that this proposition may be true, but only if other conditions concerning 
maladaptation costs, renegotiation costs and the probability to see the contract enforced are 
met.  Furthermore, our results stress the fact that the institutional environment in which the 
contract is embedded matters.  Propositions are tested using an original database of 71 
concession contracts.  Our results suggest an important role for economic efficiency 
concerns, as well as politics, in designing toll road concession contracts.  In this 
perspective, our work complements other empirical studies on contractual price provisions 
(Masten-Crocker 1991, Crocker-Reynolds 1993, Bajari-Tadelis 2001, Bajari & al 2006), by 
considering the case of public-private contracting, as well as other studies on public-private 
partnerships, by focusing on toll adjustment provisions and documenting the effect of 
reputation and political ideology.   
JEL codes: D23, D82, H11, H54, L9, L14, L24. 
Keywords: Contractual design, concession contract, price provisions, toll adjustment 
processes, incomplete contracting. 
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0.  Introduction 
The “infrastructure gap” in Europe has been recognised for many years and its negative 
impact on economic growth, job creation and social cohesion is felt across every country 
within the region. However, governments have limited financial resources to devote to 
increased capital expenditure and improving public services, and they face restrictions 
(including those of the Maastricht Treaty) on their ability to raise debt. In order to bridge the 
gap between the cost of the infrastructure needed and the resources available, and to ensure 
that the infrastructure is delivered as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible, Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs) are seen as one possible solution. The defining feature of a PPP is 
that the government buys services whereas in a conventional arrangement the government 
buys a physical asset. The fact is that in the last couple of decades, PPPs have become 
increasingly popular in many countries, and a variety of administrative arrangements have 
been used (see Grout and Stevens 2003).   
Nevertheless, even in the UK where there is significant resort to PPPs, still 85% of public 
investment is delivered through conventional forms of procurement (HM Treasury 2003). At 
the same time, there is a bad feedback on experience in Latin American countries (Guasch 
2004, Estache 2006,) but also in developed countries (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993, Engel 
& al 2006). This mixed context may be explained by significant contractual costs and 
difficulties to design such contractual agreements between a public authority and a private 
operator, especially concerning the way price should evolve in such long-term contracts.  For 
example, it is often noted that “A key concern with long-term PPP contracts is the level of 
flexibility that they offer to authorities to make changes either to the use of assets or to the 
level and type of services offered” (PWC 05) but at the same time huge concerns have been 
raised regarding the high incidence of renegotiation of such contracts in practice (Guasch 
2004, Estache 2006, Engel&al 2006, Martimort and Straub 2006).  
In this paper, we address this issue by focusing on the question of how parties adjust prices 
– tolls – in toll road concession contracts (highways, bridges, tunnels). In these contracts, 
concessionaires undertake the design, building, financing and operation of the relevant facility 
and their main source of revenue are the tolls that they can charge to users for the whole 
length of the concession. We can find in these contracts a Toll Adjustment Provision (TAP), 
which consists in determining ex ante the tolls that can be charged to users ex post. While 
there have been some empirical studies of how the contracting parties choose among 
alternative pricing processes in private commercial contracts or in procurement contracts 
(Masten-Crocker 1991, Crocker-Reynolds 1993, Bajari-Tadelis 2001), there has been, to our 
knowledge, no such analysis in toll infrastructure concession contracts whereas these 
contracts are special agreements in numerous ways and should deserve a special attention. 
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First, they are very long-term contracts (often over 30 years) involving a degree of uncertainty 
that is much greater than in most ordinary contracts. Indeed, forecasting errors and associated 
risks are characteristics of infrastructure projects. Second, the likelihood of opportunism in 
concession contracts is not any more to be proved (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993, Engel & 
al. 2003, Bajari and al. 2004, Guasch 2004, Engel and al. 2006, Estache 2006). Third, the 
context of infrastructure concessions is frequently characterized by imperfect verifiability of 
the investments. Fourth and finally, the stakes involved in toll adjustment provisions are huge 
since they have a direct impact on users. Political considerations may therefore interfere in the 
design of toll road concession contracts. For all of these reasons, the necessity to shape 
efficient toll adjustment processes is crucial. 
In order to highlight trade-offs between contractual flexibility and rigidity in the design of 
this price provision, we develop a simple model mixing incomplete contract theory (Hart 
1995) and transaction cost theory. More precisely, we propose an incomplete contract theory 
model with renegotiation and maladaptation costs, permitting us to study alternative contract 
forms in a refined incomplete contract framework2. 
Besides, we argue it is crucial to introduce in the analysis a particular characteristic of such 
public-private contracts, namely the potential for renegotiation even if toll adjustment 
provisions are completely rigid and well designed. This problem, highlighted by our data, 
begins to be studied for less developed countries (Guasch 2004, Laffont 2005, Guasch-
Laffont-Straub 2006) and also for developed countries (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993, 
Engel & al. 2006, Martimort and Straub 2006, Athias and Saussier 2007), and clearly 
contributes to the inefficiency of PPPs. Renegotiation is thus seen, in our model, more like a 
political decision than a way to avoid maladaptation costs of a rigid contract. We therefore 
consider the likelihood of contractual renegotiation as an independent dimension, not 
connected to the design of the contract that is signed. This is a way for us to insist on the fact 
that a more rigid contract is not a more complete (optimal) contract and thus a contract that is 
less probably renegotiated (Saussier 2000). This is in stark contrast to previous empirical 
studies on this topic, which consider that rigidity and completeness are synonyms, both 
reflecting a lower probability of renegotiation (Masten-Crocker 1991, Crocker-Reynolds 
1993, Bajari-Tadelis 2001).   
In deciding how to design the contract, contracting parties face a choice between a flexible 
contract, in which parties plan to renegotiate price once uncertainty unfolds, and a rigid 
contract, in which parties cannot commit not to renegotiate but attempt to prevent 
renegotiation. This leads to predictions about how contractual choices will vary across 
projects. Contracts for which uncertainty is low and hold-up severe are more likely to be rigid. 
                                                 
2
 Incomplete contract theory (a la Grossman and Hart), despite its name, is actually a theory of ownership rather 
than contracting. In restricting feasible contract forms, incomplete contract theory assumes what a theory of 
contracting seeks to explain (Masten-Saussier 2002). 
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We also argue that the trade-off identified in the model will play out differently across 
contracting parties’ characteristics. As renegotiation will inevitably occur when contracting 
parties decide to devise a flexible contract, they have to account for with whom they sign the 
contract. Reputation is therefore an important dimension. The model suggests that lower 
reputational capital of the contracting parties will more likely lead to rigid contracts.  
The model also leads to predictions about how contractual choices will vary across 
institutional frameworks. For instance, if the institutional framework of a country is such that 
the reliability of contract enforcement is weak, it will more likely lead to flexible contracts.  
To test our propositions, we constructed an original database consisting of 71 worldwide 
toll road concession contracts. We show, in contrast to many papers that often assume the 
rigidity of such contractual relationships, that this rigidity seems to be the exception rather 
than the rule regarding toll adjustment provisions. Indeed, we observe in our sample a great 
variety of toll adjustment provisions, from very rigid ones such as firm-fixed price provision 
in which tolls are fixed for the whole length of the concession, to very flexible ones with the 
so-called renegotiation provisions, which consist in determining ex ante periodic ex post 
negotiations of the toll adjustment provision initially chosen. 
We complement the data on the design of toll adjustment provisions with data gathered 
from contracts and other sources that describe the type of concessionaires, the traffic 
uncertainty and the complexity surrounding each project, the number of bidders, the country 
institutional framework, the experience of the public authority, the number of repeated 
interactions between the concessionaire and the public authority, political leanings, and so 
forth.  
Our main empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, results indicate a strong 
negative correlation between traffic uncertainty and the rigidity of the toll adjustment 
provision actually chosen, so that contracts for which traffic uncertainty is high are more 
likely to be flexible. Second, our data also reveals a substantial variation in contract design 
across contracting parties’ characteristics. For instance, when the public authority and the 
concessionaire have contracted repeatedly before, contracts are more likely to be flexible. The 
presumption is that both had behaved reliably so that they both now have a better reputation 
with the other. This is consistent with previous empirical studies that document the effect of 
reputation on the choice of contracts (Crocker-Reynolds 1993, Banerjee-Duflo 2000) and with 
many recent studies (Bajari-McMillan-Tadelis 2003, Doni 2005, Schugart 2005) that insist on 
the fact that reputation particularly matters in PPPs. In addition, we also find strong evidence 
of political effects. Contracts signed with left leaning public authorities, rather than with right 
leaning public authorities, appear to be more likely rigid. This seems to corroborate the 
conjecture that private concessionaires have a better reputation among right wing public 
authorities. Finally, we find strong evidence that the institutional framework impacts on the 
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rigidity of the toll adjustment provision chosen. In particular, our measure of the reliability of 
contract enforcement negatively correlates with the rigidity of the contract, so that stronger 
institutional frameworks will more likely lead to flexible contracts. 
We believe the contribution of our article is twofold. At the theoretical level, by proposing 
an incomplete contract theory model with renegotiation and maladaptation costs and hence by 
making new propositions on the design of price provisions in contracts in a formalized way, 
in contrast to the previous papers on this topic (Masten-Crocker 1991, Crocker-Reynolds 
1993). At the empirical level, by focusing on concession contracts and toll adjustment 
provisions, both never addressed before, with an original database. 
The article is organized as follows. We begin in Section 1 with a discussion on the 
economic tradeoffs involved in designing public private contracts. We then propose in Section 
2 a model of these tradeoffs leading to propositions that are to be tested. Section 3 describes 
the empirical implications of the model. In Section 4, we describe the contractual toll 
adjustment processes observed in our sample of contracts and in Section 5, we present the 
original data used in the empirical section. Section 6 contains the econometric results, and a 
final section provides concluding remarks.   
 
1.  Economic Tradeoffs in Contract Design of Public-Private 
Contracts 
In order to develop their infrastructure, public authorities (States or local authorities) may 
decide to resort either to traditional procurement contracts or to PPPs. The key difference 
between PPPs and traditional procurement is that under PPPs the private sector delivers over 
the contract length services, not assets, although providing assets is often integral to the 
services. They are therefore not only responsible for asset delivery, but also for overall project 
management and implementation, and successful operations for several years thereafter. Thus, 
PPPs are complex long-term agreements, involving non-verifiable investments, usually for 
delivering complex services or at least services in which uncertainty is high.   
The imperfect verifiability of the services in public private contracts has been largely 
emphasized.3 We are thinking, for example, of how difficult it can be to demonstrate (and 
sanction) that amendments to the terms are required by the concessionaire’s inability, rather 
than by unexpected external factors. Furthermore, the public authority often does not sue a 
                                                 
3
 In the literature, a contractual aspect is called perfectly verifiable when 1/ a third party can verify the case 
occurred in relation to this aspect; 2/ the cost of litigation that falls upon the Principal is not greater than the 
benefit which it can obtain from a sentence in its favour; 3/ the extent of the penalties is not subject to any 
limitation. When one of these three requisites is not satisfied, there is a risk of not being able to obtain the full 
enforcement of the contract (Doni 2005). 
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concessionaire for partial non-fulfillment of obligations, because litigation can require very 
long times and produce uncertain results, while it surely worsens the relationship with the 
counter-party. Lastly, the risks discharged on the contracting party cannot be unlimited. For 
this reason, the extent of the penalties cannot always be proportioned to the damage caused by 
imperfect fulfillment.   
Such characteristics of the transaction impede the crafting of complete contracts (Hart 
1995).  These non-verifiable investments may result in higher surplus or better service quality 
delivered by the private operator. In this paper, we focus on concession contracts in which the 
private operator has residual control rights over the way the service is provided. We suppose 
that, after the initial contract has been agreed, the provider may underinvest or come up with 
innovative ways of providing the service. Since such innovations could not be foreseen when 
the initial contract was designed, bargaining may take place over the splitting of the surplus 
from implementation of the innovations. The private operator’s anticipation of the outcome of 
such bargaining affects its incentive to research possible innovations, and its anticipation will 
depend on the contractual design (flexible or rigid).  
The framework proposed by the incomplete contract theory seems therefore to fit well with 
public-private contracts. However the incomplete contract theory narrowed the focus on one 
type of transaction cost – the hold-up problem. Thus, in this theoretical framework ex post 
bargaining is always efficient. This paper focuses also attention on two different kinds of 
transaction cost: maladaptation costs due to misalignment of the contract with states of nature, 
and renegotiation costs, namely haggling and friction due to ex post changes and adaptations 
when contracts are incomplete. This focus is motivated by a careful examination of public-
private contracts (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993, Engel and al.  2002, 2003 and 2006, Bajari 
and al.  2004, Guasch 2004, Estache 2006).   
Besides, as noted above, in contrast to the previous literature on this topic (Masten-Crocker 
1991, Crocker-Reynolds 1993, Bajari-Tadelis 2001), we assume that renegotiation costs are 
not a function of the contractual design. In other words, we believe that a contract in which 
contracting parties aim at covering ex ante most contingencies that may arise ex post is not 
always less renegotiated than a contract in which contracting parties do not have this goal.  
 
2.  The Model 
2.1.  Structure of the Model 
We consider two contracting parties. One is the State or a representative (local public 
authorities). The other is a private operator. The contract is such that essentially the private 
party supports investments.  This is coherent with what we observe in many PPPs. This is also 
what is considered by Hart (2003) as a specificity of such relationships. 
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A part of the investments performed by the private investors is non-verifiable (but not 
necessarily specific). Thus we make the assumption that it would be impossible or too costly 
for the State or a third party to check investments made by the private operator (see Part 1 of 
this paper for a discussion on this topic). We note these investments i. They generate a surplus 
noted R(i).4 We make the classical assumptions that R’>0 , R’’<0 and R’’’<0. 
To realize the transaction, the parties may sign two kinds of incomplete contracts: 
• On the one hand a rigid contract, in which the contracting parties are trying to specify 
the way to coordinate according to future states of nature. In other words, in such a 
contract, the parties try to prevent renegotiation, essentially by deciding the price that 
will be charged by the private operator for the whole length of the contract. 
• On the other hand a flexible contract, in which parties do not try to avoid renegotiation 
and plan to renegotiate price once uncertainty unfolds.   
We note f ∈ 0,1] ], where f ( f )  represents the impact on the ex post surplus of a rigid 
(flexible) contract. Thus we make the assumption that the ex post realized surplus of the 
transaction is a function not only of the investments but also of the adequacy of the contract to 
states of nature. f  measures this adequacy level. A rigid contract generates maladaptation 
costs (i.e. a realized surplus for the private operator f R(i) ≤ R(i)). A flexible contract 
generates renegotiation costs (i.e. a realized surplus )()( iRiRf ≤  to be shared between the 
contracting parties).   
We note r(i) the value of the outside option of the private operator in the case of an ex post 
contract breach. We make the assumption that r i( )= α ⋅ R i( ) with α the level of investment 
specificity.  When α  0 then investments made by the private operator do not generate any 
surplus when used outside of the contractual relationship. Investments are therefore totally 
specific to the relationship.  
Finally, as already explained, we consider the likelihood of contract renegotiation 
exogenous and we note (1- η) the probability to see a rigid contract be renegotiated.  This is 
another dimension of our model reflecting the specificity of public private partnerships.  More 
precisely, the contracting parties are often in an asymmetric position and such contracts are 
often linked to political decisions so that such arrangements might be renegotiated 
independently of what has been decided initially in the contracts (Guasch 2004; Laffont 
2005). 
The timing of the model is standard. 
                                                 
4
 In many cases, operators face well defined investment obligations. Without loss of generality, we normalize the 
size of this contractible and verifiable investment to zero. The investment i must therefore be understood as any 
additional “efficiency investment”, which we assume is non-verifiable although observable by both parties (See 
Schmidt 1996 for similar arguments).  
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Figure 1.  Timing of The Model 
1 2 3
Contract is signed Renegotiation
   Price Provisions are chosen Investments are realized may occur
f i 1−η( )
 
2.2.  Investment Levels and Contract Design 
First Best  
As a benchmark, it is useful to specify the first-best solution, which would obtain if 
investments were verifiable. Contracting parties would then choose investment level in a way 
to maximize the total economic surplus S generated by the contractual relationship given by 
S = Bo – Co + R(i*) – i*        (1) 
where Bo and Co are positive constants and respectively the social benefit and cost of 
providing the basic service without any investment. 
Thus, the optimal level of investment is i* such that 
i * R'(i*) =1         (2)  
Flexible Contracting 
When parties decide to sign a flexible contract, they accept the fact that they will have to 
renegotiate after investments have been made. Since the private operator is now entrenched as 
the provider, its bargaining power is not eroded by competition from other potential operators 
(given that it provides the service at, at least, the basic level specified in the initial contract). 
We therefore assume that the private operator and public authority (the government G) have 
equal bargaining powers and hence consider a renegotiation where the surplus generated by 
the non verifiable investments, R(i), is shared between the parties through a Nash-bargaining 
solution.5  
Private operator’s objective function is profit pi c , where6   
 
pi c = P0 − C0 +
1
2
f R(i) + r i( )[ ]− i      (3) 
                                                 
5
 Thus, following Hart-Shleifer-Vishny (1997), we assume that the public authority does not maximize the global 
surplus during renegotiations: its utility function is given by the welfare of the rest of society, excluding the 
private operator.  A justification for this is that the political process aligns the public authority’s and society’s 
interests (since the private operator has negligible voting power, his interests receive negligible weight). Of 
course, if the government placed the same weight on the private operator’s utility as on the rest of society, the 
first-best could be achieved.  
6
  The way the surplus is shared is nevertheless impacted by the outside options of each party. 
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where Po is the payment that the private operator would obtain if service provision were to be 
at its basic level. He chooses a level of investment fi
 such as 
i f R'(i f ) = 2f + α( )         (4) 
When the parties sign a flexible contract, the first best is not attainable, at the 
exception of a particular case where f =1 (i.e. there are no renegotiation costs) and α =1 (i.e. 
there are no specific investments). Surplus generated by such a contract is sub-optimal 
because of the low incentives for the operator to invest since he anticipates that he will have 
to let a part of the surplus generated by his investments to the State when renegotiation occurs 
( ≤fi  i*). 
Consumer surplus is then given by CS f, where 
CS f = B0 − P0 +
1
2
f R i f( )− r i f( )[ ]      (5) 
The social surplus S f, which is the sum of consumer surplus and the profit of the private 
operator is:  
S f = B0 − C0 + f R(i f ) − i f        (6) 
Rigid Contracting and Parties Can Commit not to Renegotiate
 
When the contracting parties devise a rigid agreement and pledge that they will not 
renegotiate then the profit of the private operator is given by:  
iiRfCPc −+−= )(00pi        (7) 
The private operator only receives a part of the surplus generated by its investments, which 
depends whether the contract matches states of nature. He chooses a level of investment 
ri such that 
ir R'(ir) = 1f          (8) 
Consumer surplus is then given by CS r, where 
CS r = B0 − P0 + 1− f( )R(ir )        (9) 
The ex post maladaptation of the contract results in the recovery by the consumers of a part of 
the surplus generated by the private operator’s investments.  This simply means that if the 
private operator thinks of investments in order to improve quality or other dimensions of the 
provided service, he anticipates that, because renegotiation is not an option, he will retain only 
 9 
a part of the generated surplus, depending on whether the initial agreement matches with 
states of nature. The other part is considered as a positive externality for consumers. 
The total surplus is then given by S r, with  
S r = B0 − C0 + R i
r( )− ir        (10) 
It can be noticed that, for a given level of investment, a flexible contract leads to a lower 
total surplus than a not renegotiated rigid contract. This is due to the fact that a flexible 
contract, in contrast to a rigid one, induces renegotiation costs that constitute deadweight 
losses.  However, this does not imply that rigid contracts are always to be preferred to flexible 
ones since the global surplus is also a function of the investments realized by private 
operators.  More precisely, under rigid contracting, private operators might underinvest for 
fear of contractual maladaptation, leading to a lower surplus compared to the flexible 
contracting case.  This will be analyzed later. 
Rigid Contracting and Parties Cannot Commit not to Renegotiate
 
Nevertheless, as discussed above, when parties sign a rigid contract, there is always a risk 
that this contract will not be applied ex post and will be renegotiated – thus leading to the case 
of an initial flexible agreement. Then, if we consider that a rigid contract might be 
renegotiated, the profit generated by such contract for the private contractor is given by  
[ ] [ ]  −++−−+−+−= iiriRfCPiiRfCPc )()(.2
1)1()(. 0000 ηηpi   (11) 
where (1-η) is the probability to see the ex ante rigid contract be renegotiated. The optimal 
level of investment is then given by 
irr R'(irr) = 2
α + f + η(2 f −α − f )        (12) 
We observe that when η = 1 (i.e. the probability to renegotiate a rigid contract is zero), we 
find the results that would occur when the government can credibly commit not to renegotiate 
(equations 8 and 12 are the same).   
Consumer surplus is then given by 
CS rr = η B0 − P0 + (1− f )R(irr)[ ]+ (1−η) B0 − P0 + 12 f .R(irr) − r(irr )[ ]
 
  
 
  
  (13) 
It follows that the total surplus is  
S rr = B0 − C0 + (1−η) f R(irr) + ηR(irr ) − irr       (14) 
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2.3.  Comparisons 
As discussed in the first part, we do not consider the case of rigid contracting without any 
renegotiation as a plausible one. Thus, in this part, we will always compare and contrast 
flexible and renegotiated rigid contracts. 
Contractual Choices and Global Surplus 
To be able to generate propositions about efficient contractual choices, and thus to be able 
to rank rigid and flexible contracting, we have to compare the generated total surplus under 
the two types of contracting.   
More precisely, a rigid contract – but renegotiated with a probability (1-η ) – will be 
preferred to a flexible one when 
Srr >Sf  B0 – Co + f R( fi ) – fi < B0 – Co + rrrrrr iiRiRf −+− )()()1( ηη      (15) 
Which leads to the following condition  
  
f R(i f ) − i f p f R(irr) − irr + η R(irr )(1− f )[ ]
loss of surplus
due to renegotiation
1 2 4 4 3 4 4 
     
(16) 
Because both investment levels irr  and i f  are increasing in f  but at different rates, it is not 
straightforward to find out clear propositions focusing on surplus comparison (i.e. a change in 
the level of f  has a direct impact and an indirect impact through investment levels). 7  This is 
also true for the other parameters in our model.  The partial derivatives in order to disentangle 
direct effect and indirect effects (i.e. through investment levels) of each of our parameters are 
presented in Appendix 0.  They lead us to the following propositions.  
 
PROPOSITION 1. (1) Suppose   f f α .  
Then, the higher the maladaptation costs (i.e. the lower f ), the more 
efficient a flexible contract compared to a rigid one. 
Proof. (See Appendix 0) 
The assumption f > α  is, in our case, a realistic assumption. Investments made in road 
infrastructures, because they are non removable, are completely specific to the relationship 
(i.e. α → 0).  Furthermore, such contracts signed between private operators and the State, 
                                                 
7
 It is one striking difference between our model and standard incomplete contract models, in which 
renegotiation under symmetric information ensures that all organization choices yield an ex post efficient 
outcome (i.e. the only difference between the organizational choices concerns the choice of ex ante investment 
levels).  This is not the case in our framework because we postulated renegotiation costs. 
 11 
when they lead to renegotiation, are characterized by conflicts and renegotiation costs (i.e. 
  f ff 0). 
Proposition 1 is intuitive. Signing a flexible contract is a way to avoid maladaptation costs. 
The higher the maladaptation costs, the more interesting it is to avoid them through a flexible 
contract. 
Other trade-offs highlighted by our derivatives depend crucially on the investment level 
considered under each contractual form. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. (1)  Suppose f > α  
  (2)  Suppose   η f 0   
  (3) 
  
irr f i f ⇔ 2 f − f( )f α ⇒ f f f + α2 .  
  Then, the higher the probability to renegotiate a rigid contract, the more 
efficient a flexible contract compared to a rigid one. 
 
PROPOSITION 3. (1)  Suppose f > α  
 (2) Suppose   η f 0  
 (3) 
  
irr f i f ⇔ 2 f − f( )f α ⇒ f f f + α2 .  
 Then, the higher the level of asset specificity (i.e. the lower α ), the less 
efficient a flexible contract compared to a rigid one.  
Proof. (See Appendix 0) 
Condition (3) constrains maladaptation costs to be bounded compared to renegotiation costs.  
This is likely to be the case in our contracts since they include guarantees for the private 
operator in cases maladaptation costs are too high (like guarantees against force majeure 
risks).   
Proposition 2 highlights the fact that rigid contracts might be useful only as long as 
contracting parties believe that it has a fairly good probability to be enforced.  In fact, there is 
no point in signing a rigid contract if one knows that it will be renegotiated.   
Proposition 3 stresses the fact that rigid contracts, by defining ex ante the way the surplus 
(generated by the investments made by the operator) is to be shared, might secure the 
operator. 
 
PROPOSITION 4. (1) Suppose f > α  
 (2) Suppose 
  
η f R(i
rr) − R(i f )
R(irr)  
 (3) Suppose 
  
irr f i f ⇔ 2 f − f( )f α ⇒ f f f + α2 .  
   
 Then, the lower the renegotiation costs, the more efficient a flexible 
contract compared to a rigid one. 
Proof. (See Appendix 0) 
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Proposition 4 is intuitive.  As soon as you consider the case when maladaptation costs are 
bounded compared to renegotiation costs (condition (1)), then the lower the renegotiation 
costs, the more efficient a flexible contract compared to a rigid one only if the probability not 
to renegotiate a rigid contract is high enough (condition (2)).  If the probability to renegotiate 
the contract was nearly one, then there is no advantage of using flexible contracts compared to 
rigid one, because rigid and flexible contracts become similar devices. 
 
Those propositions are intuitive.  Nevertheless, we would like to point out the fact that they 
differ from previous incomplete contract theory models.  As we already noticed, previous 
works using an incomplete contract framework focused on the make or buy issue, opening the 
way for critics saying that the incomplete contract theory is only a property right theory and 
has nothing to say about alternative contractual choices.  Furthermore, our results highlight 
the fact that trade-offs are complex and do not correspond to previous propositions coming 
from a transaction cost framework (Masten-Crocker 1991; Crocker-Reynolds 1993).  More 
precisely, those previous works argue that a rigid contract is to be preferred as soon as 
specific assets are high.  We highlight the fact that this proposition may be true, but only if 
other conditions concerning maladaptation costs, renegotiation costs and the probability to see 
the contract enforced are met.  Lastly, our results stress the fact that the institutional 
environment in which the contract is embedded matters.  In fact, the probability to see the 
contract enforced is clearly part of this institutional framework. 
 
3. Relating The Model To Data 
Our model points out the costs and benefits of two types of contractual design. In this 
section, we describe the empirical implications of this model.  
Our model yields one elementary prediction about how contractual choices will differ 
across institutional frameworks. As highlighted before, we assume that the likelihood of 
unanticipated renegotiation is exogenous, i.e. disconnected from the contractual design. 
Renegotiation is thus considered, in our model, as a political decision. The probability of 
renegotiation is therefore correlated with the institutional and regulatory environment in 
which the contract takes place. To the extent that it is useless to devise a rigid contract if one 
knows that it will be renegotiated, a first prediction is therefore that weak institutional 
frameworks (e.g. the reliability of contract enforcement is weak) will more likely lead to 
flexible contracts. 
Our model also yields two predictions about how the contractual design will differ across 
project characteristics. First, the theory suggests that contracting parties are less likely to 
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design rigid contracts for which the uncertainty is higher (proposition 2).  The intuition is that 
maladaptation costs are a function of uncertainty, so that the higher the uncertainty, the higher 
the probability that the rigid contract will be badly specified. Second, following directly from 
proposition 3, the theory predicts that contracting parties are more likely to devise rigid 
contracts for which the degree of investment specificity is high.  
A further set of predictions that emerges from the theoretical framework concerns the 
magnitude of the renegotiation costs. The model suggests that the higher the renegotiation 
costs, the more likely contracts will be rigid. The straightforward empirical implications of 
this proposition involve differences in contracting parties’ characteristics as well as 
differences in institutional environments. In fact, on the one hand, costs of ex post adaptation 
are a function of the willingness of the contracting parties to enter or not in conflicts, haggling 
and friction. Thus, when parties decide to devise a flexible contract, they have to account with 
whom they sign the contract, as renegotiation will inevitably occur. Reputation is therefore an 
important dimension, reducing the probability of high ex post renegotiation costs. To this 
extent, it is possible that differences in political ideology (e.g. left or right leaning public 
authorities) might affect contractual choices. On the other hand, the institutional framework 
might also impact on the contracting parties opportunism to the extent that it impacts on the 
probability of success of an opportunistic behavior. Thus, weak institutional frameworks, in 
which the probability of success of an opportunistic behavior is high, imply the possibility of 
important renegotiation costs and then will more likely lead to rigid contracts. The overall 
impact of the institutional environment on the contractual rigidity is therefore ambiguous (it 
has a positive impact through η  but a negative one through f )  
To test our propositions, we now turn to the case of toll adjustment provisions in 
infrastructure concession contracts. 
 
 
4. Toll Adjustment Processes in Infrastructure Concession 
Contracts 
4.1.  The Particular Case of Infrastructure Concessions 
The degree of complexity and uncertainty and the likelihood of opportunism come directly 
to bear in the design of infrastructure concession contracts. By its nature, infrastructure 
concession, as long-term contracts, involves a high degree of uncertainty. Some might 
therefore say that there is nothing new here and that most business decisions are taken in the 
face of uncertainty. But it is a matter of degree, and uncertainty in infrastructure decision is 
generally much greater than in most ordinary business decisions (Prud’homme 2004). As a 
matter of fact, forecasting errors and associated risks are characteristics of infrastructure 
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projects. Studies of such errors show that construction costs are generally underestimated and 
traffic overestimated, by large amounts. Errors of 50% or more seem to be the rule rather than 
the exception (Pickrell 1990; Flyvbjerg 1997, 2002, 2003; Odeck 2004).  
The likelihood of opportunism in concession contracts is not any more to be proved as 
well. The related literature to concession contracts, empirical (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 
1993, Guasch 2004, Bajari and al.  2006, Engel and al. 2006, Estache 2006) as well as 
theoretical (Williamson 1976), points out that these contracts between a public authority and a 
private entity are particularly pervasive renegotiations prone. In a study on more than 1,000 
concession contracts awarded during the 1990s in Latin America, Guasch (2004) found that, 
within three years, terms had been changed substantially in over 60% of the contracts. 
According to him, the frequency of renegotiation is troubling because the contractual changes 
often are not desirable. In some cases, renegotiations allow governments to expropriate 
concessionaires after they have sunk their investments. In other cases, concessionaires 
renegotiate contracts in order to shift losses to taxpayers.   
The design of contractual compensation processes in infrastructure concession contracts is 
not regulated, i.e. there are no rules that determine the set of allowable toll adjustment 
processes. This is another particular feature of infrastructure concession contracts and this 
complete freedom in determining the contractual compensation arrangement explains their 
great diversity and complexity, highlighted in the next part. This strengthens the relevance of 
the analysis of the choice of the toll adjustment process. 
Finally, concession contracts are most often awarded under an open bidding procedure, 
usually in two stages; in the first stage, private consortiums submit their technical 
qualifications, following the rules defined by the public authority. In the second stage, 
qualified consortiums, i.e. the consortiums selected after the first step, are allowed to bid. The 
concession is then awarded to the consortium with the best bid (sometimes there is an 
additional stage between the second stage and the selection of the best bid, which consists in 
selecting the two best bidders and asking them to submit in a third stage their Best and Final 
Offer). Most of toll road concession contracts are awarded via low-bid auctions with 
adjudication criteria going from the lowest toll, to the lowest public subvention required, or to 
the shorter length of the concession. Once the best offer is selected, there is the so-called 
“preferred bidder phase”, during which the public authority negotiates with the preferred 
bidder the final terms of the contract. Thus, during this phase, the public authority and the 
private operator, through negotiation, have the opportunity to make the contract more rigid or 
more flexible. Although this preferred bidder phase is nowadays questioned because of 
transparency problems, leading to more and more adhesion contracts, all the contracts of our 
database are concerned by this phase. This feature of the award process of toll infrastructure 
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concessions introduces reputational considerations in the choice of contractual terms, making 
the study of such a choice even more interesting.     
4.2.  Toll Adjustment Types 
The toll adjustment processes that we have found in our sample, which we now address in 
detail, are summarized in the following Table 1. Toll – or price – adjustment processes can be 
divided into two categories, automatic processes and renegotiation processes, except for the 
most stringent possibility, the “firm-fixed price” contract (FFP), in which price is specified to 
be independent of future events. The FFP contracts are however very scarce in infrastructure 
concessions because of their high uncertainty, as discussed above.   
Automatic Adjustment Processes 
Automatic provisions adjust tolls periodically according to predefined formula. The most 
extreme, rigid form of this category is a definite escalator (DE) that adjusts tolls according to 
an explicit, predefined schedule, increasing tolls at a stipulated rate, for example. While the 
toll that applies at a particular date is easily determined by reference to the contract, definite 
escalators have the obvious disadvantage of failing to make use of information arising over 
the course of the relationship and thus suffer many of the deficiencies of firm-fixed price 
contracts. Parties have then devised DE contracts that provide more flexibility, by allowing 
the concessionaire a predefined margin around the adjusted price (DE/MARG). Still, even 
these contracts may miss cost or demand changes specific to a particular transaction and thus 
adjust tolls imperfectly. On the other hand, contracting parties are ensured of the sharing of 
the surplus. 
In contrast, fixed-price with economic price adjustment (EPA) contracts attempt to relate 
contract tolls to market conditions as they unfold. The process of compensation is formulaic 
and the equation ties toll to market data such as the consumer price index or specific labor or 
materials indices. In practice, the flexibility of such a contract depends upon the number and 
importance of the indexed categories. This is the reason why we have distinguished the fixed-
price with partial economic price adjustment contract, which uses the consumer price index to 
determine tolls according to an agreed-upon compensation formula (FP/CPI), from the fixed-
price with economic price adjustment contract, which uses cost indices (FP/COST). 
Implementation remains thus straightforward, while tolls become more flexible. But the 
requirement that the contingencies and the compensation formulas must be explicitly 
prespecified constrains the flexibility of such contracts. Besides, the practicality of indexing is 
limited by the relationship-specific nature of many of the assets developed that isolates the 
parties from market alternatives. The possibility for the concessionaire to be ensured of a 
fixed minimum increase of the fixed-price through a definite escalator (FP/EPA/DE), or to 
have a predefined margin around the adjusted price (FP/EPA/MARG), or a traffic variation 
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indexation (FP/EPA/TRAFFIC) in the compensation formula, even if it provides more 
flexibility, does not remove these drawbacks.  
Parties have also devised adjustment provisions such as not-to-exceed price (NTEP) 
clauses, which afford more flexibility while constraining seller opportunism. The not-to-
exceed price (NTEP) has been specified initially and the concessionaire has to negotiate with 
the public authority the determination of a firm price at or below the ceiling. Thus, NTEP 
contracts are not pure automatic adjustment processes insofar as the final price is the result of 
a negotiation but they are also not renegotiation provisions inasmuch as the contracting parties 
do not specify ex ante periodic negotiation of the toll adjustment process. In addition, in all 
the contracts resorting to this NTEP adjustment, the toll ceiling is loosened by indexing those 
tolls to the consumer price index (NTEP/CPI) or to prespecified cost indices (NTEP/COST). 
This approach entails less prespecification than FP/CPI or FP/COST, as contingencies that 
may influence the final toll are not enumerated. Nevertheless, the not-to-exceed-price 
specified initially may turn out to be unsuitable (due to forecasting errors on construction 
costs or traffic). Thus, to protect concessionaires from unsuitable compensation adjustment, 
parties have devised not-to-exceed-price with economic price adjustment contracts – CPI or 
COST or both – that either ensure the concessionaire a fixed minimum increase of the NTEP 
through a definite escalator (NTEP/DE/EPA), or an indexation to traffic variation 
(NTEP/TRAFFIC/EPA), or a margin of prices (NTEP/EPA/MARG). Still, even these 
contracts do not totally protect the concessionaire from an unsuitable ceiling toll. In addition, 
the need to check and validate traffic variation makes the provisions with indexation to traffic 
variation more costly to implement than mere index formulas and, being less definite, 
introduce a somewhat greater prospect of strategic behavior. The most flexible option, as an 
automatic adjustment process, affords the concessionaire total freedom in determining and 
imposing tolls during ten years and then establishes a NTEP with indexation to cost indices 
adjustment for the rest of the concession (FREE/NTEP/COST).   
Renegotiation Adjustment Processes  
Parties have also devised in our sample of contracts renegotiation provisions (RENEG), 
which consist in determining ex ante periodic ex post negotiations of the initial adjustment 
process. Thus, periodically, parties take into account the full range of relevant information 
before reaching agreement on toll. These provisions afford therefore the transaction a 
considerable degree of flexibility. Nevertheless, the parties may structure the negotiation 
process by, for example, defining in the contract the sequence of offers and acceptances or 
specifying the defaults if agreement cannot be reached. The advantage of renegotiation 
adjustment processes is obvious. They permit the parties to take full advantage of current 
information in adjusting tolls. Hence, they provide a high degree of flexibility. But they also 
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expose the parties to the costs of having to negotiate mutually acceptable terms. Under these 
arrangements, there is a considerable scope for exercising subtle bargaining strategies.   
The following table summarizes toll adjustment process.  The first eight price adjustment 
processes are rigid enough to work without any external intervention.  They clearly are rigid 
toll adjustments, accepting maladaptation costs in order to avoid ex post renegociation.  The 
last seven price adjustment processes explicitly open the room for ex post negotiation as the 
final price is the result of a negotiation between the private operator and the public authority.  
 
Table 1: Toll Adjustment Types 
Type Negotiated Ex Ante           Negotiated Ex Post
Firm-fixed price (FFP) Price No negotiation ex post 
Definite escalator (DE) Price , escalator Only adjustment to price according to an explicit predefined schedule
Definite escalator with a margin 
(DE/MARG)
Price , escalator, margin
Only adjustment to price according to an explicit 
predefined schedule with the flexibility afforded by a 
predefined margin
Fixed price with partial 
economic price adjustment 
(FP/CPI)
Price, Economic price adjustment 
formula based on the consumer price 
index
Only formulaic adjustment to price as specified ex 
ante
Fixed price with economic price 
adjustment  (FP/COST)
Price, Economic price adjustment 
formula based on specific labor or 
materials indices
Only formulaic adjustment to price as specified ex 
ante
Fixed price with EPA and with a 
definite escalator (FP/EPA/DE)
Price, Economic price adjustment 
formula, definite escalator
Only formulaic adjustment to price as specified ex 
ante and according to an explicit predefined schedule
Fixed price with EPA and with a 
margin (FP/EPA/MARG)
Price, Economic price adjustment 
formula, margin
Only formulaic adjustment to price as specified ex 
ante  with the flexibility afforded by a predefined 
margin
Fixed price with EPA and with 
traffic variation indexation 
(FP/EPA/TRAFFIC)
Price, Economic price adjustment 
formula, traffic indexation
Only formulaic adjustment to price as specified ex 
ante and to traffic variation
Not-to-exceed price with partial 
economic price adjustment 
(NTEP/CPI) 
Ceiling price, Economic price 
adjustment formula based on the 
consumer price index
A firm price at or below the ceiling
Not-to-exceed price with 
economic price adjustment 
(NTEP/COST)
Ceiling price, Economic price 
adjustment formula based on specific 
labor or materials indices
A firm price at or below the ceiling
Not-to-exceed price with a 
definite escalator and an 
economic price  adjustment 
(NTEP/DE/EPA)
Ceiling price, definite escalator, 
Economic price adjustment formula A firm price at or below the ceiling
Not-to-exceed price with a traffic 
variation indexation and an 
economic  price adjustment 
(NTEP/TRAFFIC/EPA)
Ceiling price, Traffic variation 
indexation, Economic price 
adjustment formula
A firm price at or below the ceiling
Not-to-exceed price with 
economic price adjustment and 
with a margin 
(NTEP/EPA/MARG)
Ceiling price,  Economic price 
adjustment formula, Margin A firm price at or below the ceiling
Freedom during ten years and 
then NTEP/COST 
(FREE/NTEP/COST)
Ceiling price,  Economic price 
adjustment formula based on specific 
labor or materials indices
A firm price at or below the ceiling after ten years
Renegotiation Adjustments 
(RENEG)
Initial automatic adjustment process, 
Frequency of renegotiation A firm price
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4.3.  Toll Adjustment Types and Contractual Rigidity 
The description of the toll adjustment processes found out in our sample of contracts, 
points out that contracting parties do not determine future prices with the same degree of 
rigidity. As already discussed, the choice between the various adjustment types will reflect the 
relative costs of governing relationships under the respective arrangements. On the one hand, 
renegotiation provisions generally offer wider latitude to respond to changing conditions but 
subject the parties to the need to negotiate prices on a regular basis. On the other hand, 
automatic adjustment processes avoid the expense of negotiations but are less sensitive to 
relationship-specific events.   
As a consequence, we may rank the contract types encountered in infrastructure 
concessions according to a qualitative index of rigidity. The following tables 2 and 3 indicate 
the ranking of price adjustment processes that are used in the empirical part, where lower 
numerical values correspond to less rigid contracts8. The most specific contract in this regard 
is clearly the FFP, which permits no toll adjustment at all. When escalated by a definite 
adjustment or by an economic price adjustment tied to the consumer price index or the 
realized costs of important inputs, the contract is less rigid, yet more rigid than NTEP 
contracts, and their different variations, which afford the concessionaire more flexibility in 
determining tolls according to the actual context, but also substantial scope for opportunism. 
Nevertheless, the upper bound restrains the most opportunistic redistributive strategies, in 
contrast to renegotiation adjustments, which however permit the parties to take full advantage 
of current information.   
 
Table 2: Dependent Variable Used in the Ordered Logit Estimations (11 groups) 
            Frequency      Mean 
TYPE  = 1 if RENEG       3       6,28 
 = 2 if FREE/NTEP/COST     10 
 = 3 if NTEP/EPA/MARG     10 
 = 4 if NTEP/TRAFFIC/EPA     3 
 = 5 if NTEP/DE/EPA      3 
 = 6 if NTEP/COST or NTEP/CPI    4 
 = 7 if FP/EPA/MARG     10 
= 8 if FP/EPA/TRAFFIC     2 
= 9 if FP/EPA/DE      12 
 = 10 if FP/COST or FP/CPI     6 
 = 11 if DE or DE/MARG or FFP    8 
 
                                                 
8
 In order to perform econometric tests on toll adjustment processes, we have decided to make two classifications 
of our contracts. One classification reduces the number of observed processes from 15 to 11; the second one 
from 15 to 5. Using the two classifications is a way to see how robust our results are according to the way 
adjustments are classified. 
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Table 3: Dependent Variable Used in the Ordered Logit Estimations (5 groups) 
            Frequency      Mean 
TYPE  = 1 if RENEG       3       3,42 
 = 2 if FREE/NTEP/COST     10 
 = 3 if NTEP        20 
 = 4 if FP       30 
 = 5 if DE or FFP      8  
 
Our hypothesis is that the degree of contractual rigidity chosen by the contracting parties is 
influenced by the factors discussed in section 2. 
 
5.  Infrastructure Concession Contracts: Data 
5.1.  Description of the Dataset of Contracts 
We have constructed a panel dataset consisting of 71 toll road concession contracts 
(highways, bridges, tunnels). These 71 contracts refer to 45 original contracts and to 26 
renegotiated contracts, referred to as “supplemental agreements”. These supplemental 
agreements correspond to non-anticipated agreed-upon modifications to the original contract9, 
and the fact that they create new and different arrangements between the parties make it 
possible to consider them as new contracts (See Crocker-Reynolds 1993 for a similar 
methodology). Most projects in the sample (76%) are French, the rest concerns contracts from 
Greece, United Kingdom, Canada, Portugal, Benin, Chile and Thailand. Tables 4 and 5 show 
the distribution of the toll adjustment provisions according to their classification by country. 
The contracts have been devised with different operators. The oldest contracts in the sample 
were implemented in 1970, whereas the latest in 2005.   
 
Table 4: Distribution of the Toll Adjustment Provisions (11 Groups) by Country 
                                                 
9
 In contrast to Crocker-Reynolds (1993), these supplemental agreements are not contract renegotiations due to 
the presence of NTEP or renegotiation provisions in the initial contract. These supplemental agreements follow 
from the willingness of the contracting parties to change some contractual terms, including in some cases the 
initial toll adjustment process. 
COUNTRY
TYPEADJUSTREGROUP 11 Benin Canada Chile France Greece Portugal Thailand UK Total
1 3 3
2 10 10
3 10 10
4 3 3
5 1 1 1 3
6 4 4
7 10 10
8 2 2
9 12 12
10 1 1 2 2 6
11 1 3 4 8
Total 1 2 3 54 4 2 4 1 71
 20 
Table 5: Distribution of the Toll Adjustment Provisions (5 Groups) by Country 
 
5.2.  Contractual Record  
Using the convention for contractual rigidity from Table 2 (11 groups), we present the 
contractual record in Table 6. The horizontal axis identifies the year in which the contract was 
negotiated, and the vertical axis indicates the year in which an amendment to the original 
contract, i.e. a supplemental agreement, was implemented. Entries correspond to contractual 
observations, where contracts with private operators (semi-public companies) are those 
without (with) parentheses. For example, the concession contract originally negotiated in 
1970 as a FREE/NTEP/COST contract was renegotiated in 1995 to establish a 
NTEP/EPA/MARG contract, and then in 2004, resulting in the more complete 
FP/EPA/MARG contract. Some contracts, such as the one negotiated in 1991, were never 
renegotiated.   
Several aspects of this contractual record draw immediate attention. The first is the 
extensive use of contract renegotiation (34% of the original contracts were renegotiated at 
least once, and 57% of the original contracts signed before 2000 were renegotiated at least 
once). Contracts tend to be less rigid initially, anticipating renegotiation to a more rigid form 
at some future date.   
A second important characteristic of the data is that road concession contracts have 
become substantially more rigid over time. Whereas the mean of adjustment types observed 
for the road concession contracts initially negotiated between 1970 and 2000 is 4,6, the mean 
of those signed between 2000 and 2005 is 7,6. 
A final point worth noting is the apparent asymmetry between semi-public and private 
concessionaires. Contracts with totally private concessionaires are quite systematically less 
rigid than those with semi-public concessionaires. The contract year 2004 is, in this respect, 
very revealing. This is a counter-intuitive observation as one might expect contracts with 
semi-public concessionaires to be more flexible since they are supposed to behave less 
opportunistically, having quite the same interests as the State or its representative. In fact, in 
France, the State holds more than 90% of these semi-public concessionaires’ capital (Cour des 
Comptes 1998). As a result, they may be considered as not-for-profit firms (Bennett-Iossa 
2005).  
COUNTRY
TYPEADJUSTREGROUP 5 Benin Canada Chile France Greece Portugal Thailand UK Total
1 3 3
2 10 10
3 1 14 4 1 20
4 1 3 24 2 30
5 1 3 4 8
Total 1 2 3 54 4 2 4 1 71
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5.3.  Explanatory variables 
The model developed in section 2 suggests several factors that are likely to influence the 
contractual degree of flexibility chosen by the parties. 
Regarding variables affecting the marginal costs of contractual rigidity, the most 
prominent consideration is the extent to which the environment associated with the 
transaction is complex and uncertain. One of the primary sources of uncertainty facing parties 
during contractual negotiations over a road concession contract is the difficulty of forecasting 
future traffic with any confidence. This uncertainty on the future demand may be more or less 
important according to the context of the project. To quantify this traffic uncertainty, we 
surveyed a set of managers of a French private concessionaire, asking them to rate the traffic 
uncertainty surrounding each project (more information about the data collection process 
about traffic uncertainty is presented in Appendix 1). As a matter of fact, when negotiating a 
contract, the parties have expectations about the degree of traffic uncertainty likely to be 
experienced in the course of the exploitation phase. We capture this uncertainty in the 
explanatory variable TRAFFIC, which corresponds to the average rating between 1 and 5 
given by managers regarding the traffic uncertainty for every contract. We made sure that the 
respondents gave consistent answers to all the questions, probing them if there was an 
inconsistency.10 The hypothesis is that increasing traffic uncertainty, as reflected by an 
increase in the rate given by CEOs, should lead to more flexible arrangements. 
This traffic uncertainty is accompanied moreover by uncertainty on construction costs. 
Indeed, the project may take more effort than estimated either because the conditions of 
construction are not those envisioned (discovery of an archaeological site, bad soil, soil 
contaminated…), or the project requires the use of innovative and untested technologies in the 
design and construction of infrastructure (it is mainly the case for bridges and tunnels). As for 
traffic uncertainty, data on construction costs uncertainty have been obtained from the rating 
by managers, on a scale from 1 to 5, of projects’ complexity. To capture this effect, we 
include as an explanatory variable COMPLEXITY. We are confident that the figure we have 
obtained for the traffic uncertainty as well as for construction cost uncertainty are reliable. 
The hypothesis is that increasing project’s complexity, as reflected by an increase in the 
average rate, should lead to more flexible arrangements.       
Another important source of uncertainty stems from the difficulty of predicting future 
economic conditions with any confidence. We capture the increasing uncertainty associated 
with long time horizons in the variable DURATION, defined as the number of months 
between the completion of the infrastructure construction and the end of the concession. The 
hypothesis is that longer duration increases uncertainty and the costs of implementing more 
                                                 
10
 For each contract, we obtained at least three managers notations. Very few contracts have given rise to 
different notations. 
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rigid contracts, leading to more flexible arrangements. Because contract duration is an 
endogenous variable, we correct for the possibility of endogeneity bias by substituting 
predicted value DURATION* from reduced-form estimations of this variable11 and using two-
stage least square method (2SLS).  
Regarding now the magnitude of renegotiation costs, the reputation of the contracting 
parties may serve as a useful guide. Indeed, as explained above, the public authority has the 
opportunity to take the concessionaire’s reputation into account and consequently modify the 
contractual terms during the preferred bidder phase. In the same way, the concessionaire 
might not propose the same offer according to the procuring authority with which the 
concessionaire is dealing with. 
There are several mechanisms by which reputation can evolve (Banerjee and Duflo 2000). 
First, in those cases where the public authority and the concessionaire12 have contracted 
before, the presumption is that both had behaved reliably so that they both now have a better 
reputation with the other. We capture this effect in the variable REPEATED CONTRACT. 
Second, as explained above, it is possible that differences in political ideology (e.g. left or 
right leaning public authorities) might affect contractual choices. In fact, on the one hand, left 
leaning public authorities are generally more skeptical than right leaning public authorities 
about the delegation of public services to private operators. This means that private 
concessionaires are supposed to have a better reputation among right wing public authorities. 
On the other hand, private operators anticipate that they will more likely be expropriated 
when the procuring authority is a left leaning authority. Thus, we expect that contracts 
negotiated with left wing authorities will be more rigid. We capture this effect in the variable 
LEFT. 
Our model also yields one prediction about how contractual choices will differ across 
institutional and regulatory frameworks, which should reflect the likelihood of contractual 
renegotiation. In recent years, international institutions have developed numerous aggregate 
governance indicators. To capture the reliability of contract enforcement, we used the 
aggregate indicator REGULATORY QUALITY developed by the World Bank.13  In fact, this 
                                                 
11
 In addition to the exogenous variables already used in the estimations, we included the country concerned by 
the contract and institutional variables reflecting corruption and quality of the bureaucracy in the country 
concerned by the contract. We obtained a R² = 0,68.  
12
 The term concessionaire, regarding reputation issues, refers to the leader of the consortium.   
13
 Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004) constructed indicators of six dimensions of governance: Voice and 
Accountability – measuring political, civil and human rights; Political Instability and Violence – measuring the 
likelihood of violent threats to government, including terrorism; Government Effectiveness – measuring the 
competence  of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery; Regulatory Quality – measuring the 
incidence of market-unfriendly policies; Rule of Law – measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; Control of Corruption – measuring the exercise 
of public power for private gain. We performed the regressions with all these indicators and results were always 
similar. We introduced the indicator Regulatory Quality in our analysis because interviews with French 
managers of a private concessionaire indicated that the relative ratings of this indicator match up best to their 
expectations.    
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indicator measures the capacity of the government to formulate and implement policies. More 
precisely, it includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price 
controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the enforceability of 
contracts and the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as business 
development. The hypothesis is that stronger institutional frameworks will more likely lead to 
rigid contracts. Nevertheless, this variable might reflect not only the probability to see the 
contract renegotiated but also the fact that a renegotiation will be less costly ( f →1), all 
things being equal. Therefore, the expected sign might be positive or negative, depending of 
which of these effects is dominating. 
In addition, we include in the regressions several control variables. First, in our sample of 
contracts, we have 71 contracts that refer to 45 original contracts and to 26 renegotiated 
contracts, referred to as “supplemental agreements”. As pointed out before, we consider these 
supplemental agreements as new contracts (following Crocker-Reynolds 1993). We control 
for the possibility that these contracts are specific by using a dichotomous variable SUP 
AGREEMENT. 14  
Besides, the ability of the procuring authority to negotiate price provisions depends on the 
number of bidders. The hypothesis is that the availability of alternative suppliers increases the 
negotiation power of the public authority during the preferred bidder phase, leading to the 
adoption of more rigid contracts. Thus, we include as an explanatory variable NUMBER OF 
BIDDERS.  
Furthermore, in our sample of contracts, there are private and semi-public concessionaires. 
We use the dichotomous variable SEMCA15 as an additional control variable.  
Finally, it has been emphasized in Section 5.2. that agreements tend to become more rigid 
over time. This may be a consequence of the reduction of traffic uncertainty out in time, but 
also of an evolution of the contractual practices due to a learning effect of the procuring 
authorities. Thus, to capture this effect, we incorporate in the estimates the variable 
LEARNING EFFECT, defined as the number of former contracts of the public authority with 
private concessionaires. 
The variables used in our estimations are summarized in the following Table 7 and their 
distribution by country is given in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is given in Appendix 3. 
 
                                                 
14
 The main econometric results are not affected when considering only the sub sample without any 
supplemental agreements.  Partial results are presented in section 7. More is available on request. 
15
 SEMCA for semi-public companies concessionaires of highways. 
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Table 7: Data Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition
TYPE OF ADJUSTEMENT   
(5 GROUPS)
71 3.42 1.01 1 5
Ranking of toll adjustment types in 5 groups (See 
Table 3)
TYPE OF ADJUSTEMENT 
(11 GROUPS)
71 6.28 3.28 1 11
Ranking of toll adjustment types in 11 groups 
(See Table 2)  
COMPLEXITY 71 2.19 1.29 1 5
Average rating on uncertainty on construction 
costs 
TRAFFIC 71 2.39 1.13 1 5 Average rating on traffic uncertainty 
LEFT 71 .31 .46 0 1
1 if the procuring authority is a left wing 
authority; 0 otherwise
REPEATED CONTRACT 71 5.26 4.20 0 11
Number of former interactions between the 
concessionaire and the public authority 
SUP AGREEMENT 71 .46 .50 0 1
1 if the contract is a supplemental agreement; 0 
otherwise
NUMBER OF BIDDERS 69 1.66 1.24 1 5 Number of bidders for the contract
DURATION 68 396.44 183.06 60 1164
Number of months between the completion of the 
infrastructure construction and the end of the 
concession
DURATION* 66 401.18 149.41 213.72 853.63
Predicted values for the variable DURATION using 
instrumental variables technic
LEARNING EFFECT 71 6.78 4.59 0 16
Number of former contracts of the public 
authority with private concessionaires
REGULATORY QUALITY 71 1.02 .30 -.48 1.82
Rating obtained by the country in question 
regarding this governance dimension   (Source: 
World Bank)
SEMCA 71 .21 .41 0 1
1 if the concessionaire is a  semi public company; 
0 otherwise
 
 
6.  Econometric Results 
In order to study the way toll adjustment processes are chosen in public private 
partnerships, we have performed two set of estimates using ordered logit models.16 The first 
set of estimates is concerned by our classification of toll adjustment types in 11 groups. The 
second set of estimates is concerned by our classification in 5 groups. Using the two 
classifications is a way to see how robust our results are according to the way adjustment 
types have been classified. Furthermore, we also add in a last regression for each 
classification (models 6 & 12) results we would obtain if our dependent variable was a 
continuous one instead of a qualitative one - to check the robustness of our results - using 
two-stage least square method.  
Results are reported in Table 8. Models 1 and 7 contain only the exogenous variables 
COMPLEXITY and TRAFFIC. Models 2 and 8 take into account the reputation effect. Control 
variables have been then included in Models 3 and 9. They have fewer observations (69) 
because the number of bidders was not available for two contracts. Finally, we have included 
in Models 4 and 10 the variable DURATION. We use a two-steps ordered logit procedure in 
                                                 
16
 In our case, it is not possible to use an OLS or 2SLS models because it imposes cardinality on the ordinal 
variables TYPEADJUST5 and TYPEADJUST11. Using an ordered logit model, we consider the relationship 
Yi = βX i + εi  (i=1,2 ,..n), where Y is an unobserved latent variable, X is a set of explanatory variables and ε is a 
random disturbance. If we consider Y is in our case the price provision rigidity level, we cannot observe Y 
directly, but we can observe a category j, if µ j−1 ≤ Y ≤ µ j . The use of an ordered logit model results in 
estimates of the thresholds µ as well as the distance between them. The use of an OLS model exogenously 
assigns both. Nevertheless, we provide the two types of estimates for checking how robust our results are.  
 26 
order to correct for the potential endogeneity problem we have with duration. Results are 
given in Models 5 and 11. Again, there are fewer observations because DURATION data are 
not available for concession contracts that have been awarded through Present-Value-of-
Revenue auctions17.  
 
 
                                                 
17
 These auctions differ from auction mechanisms where the public authority sets a fixed concession term and 
firms bid tolls. Indeed, under a Present-Value-of-Revenue auction, bidders compete on the present value of toll 
revenue they require to finance the project. Thus, the concession ends when the present value of toll revenue is 
equal to the concessionaire’s bid, i.e. the concession term is undefined. For a precise description of such an 
auction mechanism, see Engel-Fischer-Galetovic (1997).   
 
27
 
Ta
bl
e 
8:
 
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
R
es
u
lts
 
 
  
m
o
d
e
l1
m
o
d
e
l2
m
o
d
e
l3
m
o
d
e
l4
m
o
d
e
l5
m
o
d
e
l6
m
o
d
e
l7
m
o
d
e
l8
m
o
d
e
l9
m
o
d
e
l1
0
m
o
d
e
l1
1
m
o
d
e
l1
2
O
rd
e
re
d
 L
o
g
it
O
rd
e
re
d
 L
o
g
it
O
rd
e
re
d
 L
o
g
it
O
rd
e
re
d
 L
o
g
it
T
w
o
 S
ta
g
e
 
O
rd
e
re
d
 L
o
g
it
2
 S
L
S
O
rd
e
re
d
 L
o
g
it
O
rd
e
re
d
 L
o
g
it
O
rd
e
re
d
 L
o
g
it
O
rd
e
re
d
 L
o
g
it
T
w
o
 S
ta
g
e
 
O
rd
e
re
d
 L
o
g
it
2
S
L
S
-1
.6
7
3
*
*
*
-2
.6
1
7
*
*
*
-2
.4
1
6
*
*
*
-2
.8
0
0
*
*
*
-2
.8
1
3
*
*
*
-0
.6
3
5
*
*
*
-1
.3
6
2
*
*
*
-2
.5
6
1
*
*
*
-2
.1
5
3
*
*
*
-2
.4
2
9
*
*
*
-2
.4
7
0
*
*
*
-2
.1
3
3
*
*
*
(-
4
.9
9
3
)
(-
5
.5
8
1
)
(-
4
.4
2
4
)
(-
4
.2
5
7
)
(-
4
.3
2
8
)
(-
5
.8
1
7
)
(-
4
.7
1
8
)
(-
6
.2
6
4
)
(-
4
.8
0
2
)
(-
4
.7
4
3
)
(-
4
.7
8
2
)
(-
6
.3
9
8
) 
  
0
.0
6
8
-0
.1
8
4
0
.0
5
7
0
.2
0
9
0
.0
7
4
0
.0
7
0
0
.2
8
7
0
.1
4
5
0
.2
1
1
0
.2
7
2
0
.2
1
5
0
.2
8
1
  
 
(0
.3
0
3
)
(-
0
.7
5
5
)
(0
.1
7
8
)
(0
.5
8
8
)
(0
.2
0
4
)
(0
.7
5
2
)
(1
.3
3
6
)
(0
.6
8
3
)
(0
.7
2
2
)
(0
.8
7
3
)
(0
.6
6
8
)
(0
.9
9
3
) 
  
-0
.2
7
8
*
*
-0
.4
6
1
*
*
-0
.2
5
4
-0
.2
0
9
-0
.0
6
1
-0
.3
6
6
*
*
*
-0
.4
6
0
*
*
*
-0
.2
5
4
+
-0
.2
3
5
+
-0
.3
2
9
*
*
 
(-
3
.1
1
3
)
(-
3
.2
8
8
)
(-
1
.5
7
6
)
(-
1
.3
0
2
)
(-
1
.5
9
6
)
(-
4
.4
0
9
)
(-
3
.7
3
8
)
(-
1
.8
1
6
)
(-
1
.7
2
7
)
(-
2
.8
3
8
) 
  
1
.7
6
4
*
*
1
.3
3
6
+
1
.1
9
5
0
.9
4
0
0
.2
8
8
1
.7
7
6
*
*
1
.6
3
9
*
1
.6
4
9
*
1
.4
5
5
*
1
.3
3
2
*
  
(2
.8
3
3
)
(1
.8
4
9
)
(1
.5
4
5
)
(1
.2
5
0
)
(1
.5
8
2
)
(3
.1
9
8
)
(2
.4
8
3
)
(2
.4
1
1
)
(2
.2
0
4
)
(2
.3
9
2
) 
  
0
.1
4
9
0
.6
7
5
+
0
.4
6
7
0
.1
8
7
*
0
.4
0
6
0
.9
7
9
*
0
.8
3
3
*
0
.8
0
5
*
*
 
(0
.4
5
4
)
(1
.6
8
8
)
(1
.2
0
2
)
(2
.0
6
1
)
(1
.3
3
3
)
(2
.5
6
8
)
(2
.2
2
5
)
(2
.9
0
8
) 
  
1
.9
6
4
*
1
.9
6
6
*
2
.0
7
3
*
0
.3
9
0
+
1
.3
3
1
+
1
.2
2
9
1
.3
5
1
+
0
.4
7
3
  
 
(2
.2
8
5
)
(2
.1
2
5
)
(2
.2
5
9
)
(1
.8
1
5
)
(1
.8
2
7
)
(1
.6
3
6
)
(1
.7
9
0
)
(0
.7
1
9
) 
  
-3
.9
8
0
*
*
-8
.0
6
9
*
*
*
-8
.2
0
7
*
*
*
-1
.6
2
2
*
*
*
-2
.9
6
3
*
*
-6
.1
5
5
*
*
*
-6
.5
5
9
*
*
*
-4
.0
8
7
*
*
*
(-
3
.0
9
9
)
(-
4
.0
0
7
)
(-
4
.1
3
9
)
(-
4
.6
9
8
)
(-
2
.8
2
9
)
(-
3
.8
7
9
)
(-
4
.0
9
6
)
(-
3
.8
7
4
) 
  
0
.0
9
0
-0
.0
6
3
-0
.1
7
3
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
3
4
-0
.1
1
5
-0
.1
6
1
-0
.0
1
2
  
 
(1
.0
0
1
)
(-
0
.4
7
6
)
(-
1
.1
8
9
)
(0
.1
5
8
)
(0
.4
3
5
)
(-
1
.0
2
0
)
(-
1
.3
7
4
)
(-
0
.1
1
3
) 
  
1
.6
4
3
+
1
.5
9
3
1
.9
7
7
+
0
.2
3
1
2
.4
0
9
*
*
2
.2
9
0
*
*
2
.4
6
2
*
*
2
.2
8
9
*
*
 
(1
.7
1
7
)
(1
.5
3
3
)
(1
.8
2
3
)
(0
.9
4
0
)
(2
.9
1
7
)
(2
.7
1
4
)
(2
.8
4
8
)
(3
.0
5
4
) 
  
-0
.0
0
4
+
-0
.0
0
3
(-
1
.8
4
0
)
(-
1
.4
7
7
)
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
6
*
  
(-
0
.0
0
7
)
(-
1
.6
4
7
)
(-
0
.2
4
2
)
(-
2
.2
7
4
) 
  
8
.4
6
0
*
*
*
1
3
.1
8
1
*
*
*
1
6
.2
6
0
*
*
*
2
2
.8
5
0
*
*
*
2
2
.1
9
5
*
*
*
6
.6
0
6
*
*
*
6
.5
9
1
*
*
*
1
2
.2
6
7
*
*
*
1
3
.5
4
7
*
*
*
1
8
.2
2
1
*
*
*
1
8
.3
1
6
*
*
*
1
6
.5
2
9
*
*
*
(6
.6
9
8
)
(6
.2
6
8
)
(5
.1
3
0
)
(5
.1
9
9
)
(5
.2
7
8
)
(1
2
.7
8
9
)
(6
.5
4
7
)
(7
.0
6
2
)
(5
.7
2
7
)
(6
.1
3
8
)
(6
.1
6
1
)
(1
0
.4
7
5
) 
  
M
c
F
a
d
d
e
n
 r
2
 /
 P
s
e
u
d
o
 
R
2
0
.2
2
0
.3
4
0
.4
2
0
.5
0
0
.4
8
0
.7
5
3
0
.0
9
0
.2
0
0
.3
0
0
.3
0
0
.3
1
0
.7
8
6
  
 
L
o
g
 L
ik
e
ly
h
o
o
d
-7
6
.0
2
3
0
2
-6
4
.1
8
7
7
-5
4
.1
2
0
0
7
-4
5
.2
8
6
3
8
-4
6
.9
7
2
4
4
-1
4
4
.6
9
9
2
-1
2
6
.8
7
9
6
-1
1
5
.5
3
1
8
-9
8
.7
0
0
7
5
-9
9
.8
4
3
9
7
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
N
7
1
7
1
6
9
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
1
7
1
6
9
6
6
6
6
6
6
C
O
M
P
L
E
X
IT
Y
R
E
P
E
A
T
E
D
 C
O
N
T
R
A
C
T
L
E
F
T
D
U
R
A
T
IO
N
D
U
R
A
T
IO
N
*
In
te
rc
e
p
t
T
Y
P
E
A
D
JU
S
T
5
T
Y
P
E
A
D
JU
S
T
1
1
S
E
M
C
A
N
U
M
B
E
R
 O
F
 B
ID
D
E
R
S
S
U
P
. 
A
G
R
E
E
L
E
A
R
N
IN
G
 E
F
F
E
C
T
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
T
R
A
F
IC
Si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
 
le
v
el
s:
 
+
 
0.
10
 
*
 
0.
05
 
*
*
 
0.
01
 
*
*
*
 
0.
00
1;
 
t-
st
at
s 
in
 
pa
re
n
th
es
es
.
 
 
 28 
The first striking result we observe is that the traffic uncertainty is clearly an important 
variable, driving the choice of toll adjustment type. More precisely, the higher the traffic 
uncertainty, the more flexible the toll adjustment provisions will be. This confirms our 
proposition 1, whatever the econometric model (1‰ significance level). In particular, a one 
standard deviation increase in our “traffic uncertainty” measure is associated with a decrease 
in the numerical value of the toll adjustment provision of 2 in our classification in 11 groups 
(Model 11), e.g. a shift of a toll adjustment provision of type 9 to type 7.  
However, the complexity of the project is not significant. This might be explained by the 
fact that project’s complexity concerns the construction phase and thus may not have an 
impact on the toll adjustment processes which in turn concern only the exploitation phase. 
Besides, in concession contracts, construction cost uncertainty is most often completely 
supported by the concessionaire. 
Contracts of longer DURATION appear to favor more flexible toll adjustment processes in 
our estimates but this effect is not always significant according to the econometric 
specifications. This result could corroborate the prediction of our theoretical model: the 
longer the duration of the contract, the more uncertain the future economic conditions of the 
transaction, the more difficult it is to draft a rigid contract.  
When we incorporate in the regressions variables reflecting contracting parties reputation 
(contracting parties’ connivance), we observe that they all have a significant impact on price 
provisions, confirming our prediction 4. First, the REPEATED CONTRACT variable has a 
significant negative effect on the choice of the rigidity of the toll adjustment process, 
especially when considering our 11 groups classification: an increase in the number of former 
interactions between the contracting parties will decrease the rigidity of the toll adjustment 
provision chosen. This effect is significant in nearly all our specification models. In particular, 
the fact that the contracting parties already signed 10 previous contracts together is associated 
with a decrease in the numerical value of the toll adjustment provision of 2 in our 
classification in 11 groups (Model 11), e.g. a shift of a toll adjustment provision of type 9 to 
type 7.  In addition, results indicate that left leaning procuring authorities are much more 
likely to provide rigid contracts than right leaning authorities. This finding, especially 
significant when considering our 11 groups classification, complements previous works on 
optimal contracting (Bajari-McMillan-Tadelis 2003) and runs against a recent study of Levin-
Tadelis (2005) in which the authors find that there is little correlation between voters’ broader 
political preferences and contracting practices. 
Table 6 also shows that in addition to finding a relationship between the rigidity of the toll 
adjustment provision and projects and contracting parties characteristics, we found a 
significant correlation between the rigidity of the toll adjustment provision and institutional 
frameworks. In particular, our measure of the reliability of contract enforcement negatively 
 29 
correlates with the rigidity of the contract. In other words, the stronger the institutional 
framework, the more flexible the toll adjustment provisions will be. This result suggests that 
it is the second effect of strong institutions (See Section 5.3.) that prevails, i.e. strong 
institutions constitute an important impediment to contracting parties opportunism.      
Finally, if we now turn to the effect of our control variables, we observe that the NUMBER 
OF BIDDERS variable is sometimes, depending on the specifications, significant and of the 
predicted sign, so that the availability of alternative suppliers increases the rigidity of 
contractual agreements. Supplemental agreements do not seem to be specific agreements as 
the dichotomous variable SUP AGREEMENT is not always significant, at least in our 11 
group classification. We come back on this issue in the next section. This is partly consistent 
with the results obtained by Crocker-Reynolds (1993). In the same way, results indicate the 
absence of impact of a learning effect of the procuring authorities on the design of toll 
adjustment provisions. Finally, results show that we observe an impact of the type of the 
concessionaire, i.e. private or semi-public, on the toll adjustment provision chosen. The fact 
that the concessionaire is a semi-public company seems to rigidify the contract (especially 
regarding the classification in 11 groups). A simple explanation here is that semi-public 
concessionaires do not try to negotiate more flexible contractual terms since they have the 
same interests as the public authority (the semi-public companies in question are indeed quite 
completely public). Thus, if there is a renegotiation, there won’t be haggling or friction, in 
contrast to renegotiations with private concessionaires.  
 
7. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
The econometric results are interesting and in line with our model.  Nevertheless, they are 
also fragile for several reasons.   
One possible limitation of our results would arise from ignoring a temporal evolution of 
the contractual practices regarding the design of the toll adjustment provisions. Indeed, as it 
has been emphasized in Section 5.2., agreements tend to become more rigid over time. This 
may be a consequence of the reduction of traffic uncertainty out in time, but also of an 
evolution of the contractual practices due to a learning effect or a change in political views. 
Thus, to capture this effect, we incorporate in the estimates the variable TREND (Models 13 
to 15 of Table 9).  Results show that such a trend does not exist and remain unchanged. 
Another possible limitation lies in the fact that we considered supplemental agreements as 
original contracts.  Even if we already incorporated a dummy variable to correct for the 
potential bias, we now perform our estimations on the sub sample composed only of original 
contracts (Models 14 and 16 of Table 9). Even if the number of observation decreases 
significantly, results are not at all affected. 
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However, the main limitation of our results, as already mentioned, stems from the fact that 
we have an unbalanced sample.  To feel confident with our results and to be sure that the 
overrepresentation of French contracts does not drive our results (as the Appendix 2 seems to 
show), we performed our estimates using a dummy variable FRENCH for contracts signed in 
France (Models 17 to 20).  Our main results still remain unaffected: we still observe strong 
political, institutional and uncertainty effects on contractual choices.  Nevertheless, we also 
observe a “French effect”, leading to more flexible contract compared to foreign agreements.  
Furthermore, introducing cross effects between on the one hand, our variables FRENCH and 
REPEATED CONTRACT and on the other hand, the variables FRENCH and LEARNING 
EFFECT, we observe both a repeated contract effect and a learning effect for our whole 
sample but only a repeated contract effect for the sub sample of French contracts.  This is an 
interesting result calling for a better understanding of institutional differences that might 
explain such results.  We also performed our estimates on the French contracts sub sample 
(Models 21 and 22 of Table 9) confirming those results. 
Finally, whereas in our model we consider that the contracting parties make a dichotomous 
choice (i.e. they sign either a rigid contract or a flexible one), we allow for a continuous 
choice in our empirical analysis. To correct for this lack of adequation between the model and 
our empirical part, we propose a logit estimate, using RENEGOTIABLE CONTRACT as 
explained variable (dummy variable taking the value 1 if the type of the TAP actually chosen 
is between the types 7 and 11, included, of our classification in 11 groups).  Doing this, we 
look at the willingness of the parties to sign a contract that stipulates ex ante some ex post 
renegotiations.  Results are presented in the Model 23 of Table 9; our main results still apply. 
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8.  Conclusion 
This paper has studied the contractual design of price provisions in toll infrastructure 
concession contracts. We develop a simple incomplete contract theory model with 
renegotiation and maladaptation costs that emphasizes trade-offs between contractual 
flexibility and rigidity. Propositions derived from the model differ from previous incomplete 
contract theory models. Furthermore, our results highlight the fact that trade-offs are complex 
and do not correspond to previous propositions coming from a transaction cost framework 
(Masten-Crocker 1991; Crocker-Reynolds 1993) that generally assume a monotonic 
relationship between asset specificity and the use of rigid contract.  We highlight the fact that 
this proposition may be true, but only if other conditions concerning maladaptation costs, 
renegotiation costs and the probability to see the contract enforced are met.  Our model also 
stresses the fact that the institutional environment in which the contract is embedded matters.  
It explains why uncertainty, weak connivance between the contracting parties, or lack of a 
strong institutional environment would lead to the design of more rigid contracts.  
We use this model to interpret our empirical findings about the determinants of the 
contractual design of toll adjustment provisions in worldwide toll road concession contracts. 
Using data gathered from a variety of sources, we find that toll adjustment provisions in 
infrastructure concession contracts exhibit a wide diversity contrary to what is often written. 
But more interestingly, we find that contracts characterized by high traffic uncertainty are 
likely to be less rigid and we provide strong evidence that contracting parties characteristics 
impact on the contractual design. In particular, an increase in the number of former 
interactions between the contracting parties will decrease the rigidity of the toll adjustment 
provision chosen. In the same way, we find that contracts designed with left leaning procuring 
authorities are likely to be more rigid. These results confirm and emphasize the importance of 
trust in such agreements between a public authority and a private operator. Finally, we 
provide strong evidence that institutional environments impact on contract design, so that 
contracts designed in a strong institutional environment are likely to be more flexible.  
Our analysis leaves many questions open. For instance, it would be interesting to study if a 
difference between the predicted and the observed type of toll adjustment provision translates 
in difference in performance. In addition, our results suggest that further studies are needed to 
shed lights on the concessionaires selection process in public-private contracts. Indeed, the 
efficiency of observed contractual agreements are also connected to the way concessionaires 
are selected (Bajari-McMillan-Tadelis 2003). 
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Appendix 0: Proof for propositions 1 to 4 
Looking at equation (16) we have the following condition for a rigid contract to be preferred 
to a flexible one: 
  
1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R(irr ) − irr − f R(i f ) + i f f 0    (16bis) 
 
We define ρ(.)  by the following equivalence  
y = ρ(x) ⇔ x = 2
R'(y)
 
 
In other words, for every x we have 
R' ρ(x)[ ]= 2
x
      (A1) 
 
Then we have: 
i f = ρ(α + f )  and  irr = ρ(α + f + η(2 f −α − f ))   (A2) 
 
Differentiating in x the two members of equation (1), we obtain the derivative of ρ(.) : 
  
ρ'(x) ⋅ R' ' ρ(x)[ ]= − 2
x 2
⇔ ρ'(x) = − 2
x 2 ⋅ R" ρ(x)[ ] f 0 
 
Thus function ρ(.)  is strictly increasing because R(.) is supposed strictly concave. 
 
Our problem boils down to study the mathematical properties of the function φ( f , f ,α,η) 
defined as: 
 
φ( f , f ,α,η) ≡ 1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R ρ α + f + η 2 f −α − f( )[ ]{ }
−ρ α + f + η 2 f −α − f( )[ ]− f ⋅ R ρ α + f[ ]{ }+ ρ α + f[ ] 
 
Studying the partial derivatives of function φ  we obtain: 
 
φ f' = 1−η( )R(irr) − R(i f ) + 1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr) −1{ }⋅ ∂i
rr
∂ f
− f ⋅ R'(i f ) −1{ }⋅ ∂i f∂ f
 
 
φ f' = 1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr) −1{ }⋅ ∂irr∂ f  
 
φη' = (1− f )R(irr ) + 1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr ) −1{ }⋅ ∂irr∂η  
 
φα' = 1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr) −1{ }⋅ ∂irr∂α − R'(i f ) −1{ }⋅ ∂i
f
∂α
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The first term of each derivative is capturing the direct effect holding i f and irr  constant. The 
second term is the indirect effect that is coming through the variation of irr . The third term is 
the indirect effect that is coming through the variation of i f . We can note that there is no 
direct effect for f  and α . There is also no indirect effect transiting through i f  for f , neither  
for η. 
 
Knowing that from equation (2): 
 
  
∂i f
d f = ρ' α + f[ ]f 0
∂irr
∂ f = 1−η( )⋅ ρ' α + f + η 2 f −α − f( )[ ]f 0 
 
 
  
∂i f
d f = 0
∂irr
∂ f = 2η ⋅ ρ' α + f + η 2 f −α − f( )[ ]f 0  
 
 
∂i f
dη
= 0 ∂i
rr
∂η = 2 f −α − f( )⋅ ρ' α + f + η 2 f −α − f( )[ ] 
 
 
  
∂i f
dα
= ρ' α + f[ ]f 0 ∂irr∂α = 1−η( )⋅ ρ' α + f + η 2 f −α − f( )[ ]f 0 
 
 
We can also note that because 
 
R'(i f ) = 2
α + f R'(i
rr) = 2
α + f + η 2 f −α − f( )=
2
1−η( ) α + f( )+ 2 ⋅ η ⋅ f  
We have 
 
f ⋅ R'(i f ) −1= 2 ⋅ f
α + f −1 =
f −α
α + f  
 
And similarly 
 
1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr) −1= 2 ⋅ 1−η( ) f + η[ ]− 1−η( ) α + f( )− 2 ⋅ η ⋅ f
1−η( ) α + f( )+ 2 ⋅η ⋅ f  
 
=
1−η( ) f − 1−η( )α + 2 ⋅η ⋅ 1− f( )
1−η( ) α + f( )+ 2 ⋅ η ⋅ f  
=
1−η( ) f −α( )+ 2 ⋅η ⋅ 1− f( )
1−η( ) α + f( )+ 2 ⋅η ⋅ f  
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Proof of proposition 1. 
If we assume that  
 
 f > α  
 
We know  
 
  
f ⋅ R'(i f ) −1= 2 ⋅ f
α + f −1 =
f −α
α + f f 0 
and    
  
1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr ) −1 = 1−η( ) f −α( )+ 2 ⋅η ⋅ 1− f( )
1−η( ) α + f( )+ 2 ⋅ η ⋅ f f 0 
 
It is then obvious that   
φ f' = 1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr) −1{ }⋅ ∂irr∂ f ≥ 0   
 
 
Proof of proposition 2. 
If we assume that  
 
 f > α  
   η f 0  
 
  
irr f i f ⇔ 2 f − f( )f α ⇒ f f f + α2 .  
 
Then we have 
  
∂irr
∂η = 2 f −α − f( )⋅ ρ' α + f + η 2 f −α − f( )[ ]f 0 
 
And thus 
 
  
φη' = (1− f )R(irr) + 1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr ) −1{ }⋅ ∂irr∂η f 0 
 
 
Proof of proposition 3. 
 
If we assume that  
 
 f > α  
   η f 0  
 
  
irr f i f ⇔ 2 f − f( )f α ⇒ f f f + α2 .  
Then we have  
φα' = 1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr) −1{ }⋅ ∂irr∂α − R'(i f ) −1{ }⋅ ∂i
f
∂α  
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Because of our assumptions concerning function R(.) and our parameters η and f , we know 
that  
  R'(i f ) f R'(irr)  and  1−η( ) f + η ≤1  
 
Then  
  
1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr) −1p R'(i f ) −1   and   
  
∂irr
∂α p
∂i f
∂α  
 
Thus we have 
  
φα' = 1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr) −1{ }⋅ ∂irr∂α − R'(i f ) −1{ }⋅ ∂i
f
∂α p 0 
 
 
 
Proof of proposition 4. 
 
If we assume that  
 
 f > α  
   η f 0  
 
  
irr f i f ⇔ 2 f − f( )f α ⇒ f f f + α2 .  
 
  
η f R(i
rr) − R(i f )
R(irr)  
 
We have  
 
  1−η( )R(irr) − R(i f ) p 0  
 
Following the same reasoning as in proof of proposition 3, we obtain 
 
  
φ f' = 1−η( )R(irr) − R(i f ) + 1−η( ) f + η[ ]⋅ R'(irr) −1{ }⋅ ∂i
rr
∂ f
− f ⋅ R'(i f ) −1{ }⋅ ∂i f∂ f p 0
 
 
 
Lastly, we can find some values of our parameters for our inequality (16) to be respected.  To 
show this, note that 
 
φ( f , f ,α,0) ≡ 0  
Suppose 
  
f f f + α
2
, and let choose values for f , f ,α  such that this condition is met, then: 
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φ( f , f ,α,η) = φ( f , f ,α,0)
= 0
1 2 4 3 4 
+ φ'( f , f ,α,x)dx
0
η
∫  
Indeed, if 
  
f f f + α
2
 we have 
  
φ'η ( f , f ,α,η) f 0  so    φ( f , f ,α,η) f 0  
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Appendix 1: Data Collection about Traffic Uncertainty 
Some of the data used in this paper (TRAFFIC, COMPLEXITY and NUMBER OF 
BIDDERS) were collected by interviews with three different persons of a French private 
concessionaire: the CEO and two other senior persons. The interviews were conducted 
separately and the respondents did not have any idea of the purpose of the project. Most of the 
projects were negotiated or renegotiated over the last ten years, and the persons we 
interviewed have more than 15 years of seniority in the firm. They therefore had no difficulty 
answering the questions. Regarding very old contracts, at least one of the three interviewees 
was able to answer us for each of the contracts since the firm keeps contracts’ memory green. 
Thus, cross-checking of information was not always possible for every old contract but data 
was available. 
For every contract, respondents were asked to rate between 1 and 5 the traffic uncertainty 
likely to be experienced in the course of the exploitation phase that they expected at the time 
of contract negotiation (rating 1 corresponding to a contract in which the traffic uncertainty is 
very low, i.e. the respondents have a good idea of future traffic, and 5 the opposite). 
Nevertheless, to facilitate the interviews and obtain comparable answers from respondent to 
respondent as we were conducting the interview we used a structured questionnaire so as to 
recall the respondent the general background of each project. This questionnaire (not 
exhaustive) is the following one: 
1/ Regarding the tolling culture of the country in question: are toll roads well established or 
are there no toll roads in the country? (So as to estimate uncertainty over toll acceptance) 
2/ Regarding toll-facility details:  
- Is the infrastructure in question an extension of existing roads or a Greenfield site? 
- Is the infrastructure in question a stand-alone facility or does it rely on other, 
proposed improvements? 
- Are there few competing roads or many alternative roads? 
- Is there only road competition or multimodal competition? 
3/ Regarding the users: 
- Are there few, key origins and destinations or multiple origins and destinations? 
- Is the demand profile flat or highly seasonal and/or “peaky”? 
- Is the income, time sensitive market high or low? 
4/ Is the local/national economy strong or weak? 
Once the respondent answered to these questions, he was more able to give an accurate 
rating of the traffic uncertainty of the project in question on a scale between 1 and 5.   
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Furthermore, when we did not obtain comparable answers from senior to senior, we probed 
until we reached consistency (which was usually easily done). 
 
 43 
Appendix 2: Explanatory Variables Distribution by Country  
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